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Abstract
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where n selfish agents install facilities
over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-
negative weight per agent). Agents using the same facility share fairly its installation cost, but
every agent pays individually a (weighted) connection cost to the chosen location. We study
the Price of Stability (PoS) of pure Nash equilibria and the Price of Anarchy of strong equilibria
(SPoA), that generalize pure equilibria by being resilient to coalitional deviations. A special case
of recently studied network design games, Facility Location merits separate study as a classic
model with numerous applications and individual characteristics: our analysis for unweighted
agents on metric networks reveals constant upper and lower bounds for the PoS, while anO(lnn)
upper bound implied by previous work is tight for non-metric networks. Strong equilibria do
not always exist, even for the unweighted metric case. We show that e-approximate strong
equilibria exist (e = 2.718 . . .). The SPoA is generally upper bounded by O(lnW) (W is the
sum of agents’ weights), which becomes tight Θ(lnn) for unweighted agents. For the unweighted
metric case we prove a constant upper bound. We point out several challenging open questions
that arise.
1 Introduction
Modern computer and communications networks constitute an arena of economic interactions
among multiple autonomous self-interested entities (network access providers, end-users, electronic
commerce enterprises, content storage and distribution enterprises). The internet is perhaps the
most massive and global field where economic networking interactions take place. The recently
established study of network formation games [14](chapter 19) aims at understanding how the
competitive (or coalitional) activity of multiple such selfish agents affects the network’s character-
istics and its efficiency. In this paper we consider the setting of n Content Distribution Network
enterprises interacting over a network. Enterprise i takes decisions on where to store replicas of
digital content over the network, so as to satisfy access demand of local customers, situated at node
ui. Demand is expressed by a non-negative weight wi for enterprise i. Every enterprise chooses
strategically a location v on the network for installation of content replicas, so as to minimize
its individual expenses for (a) storage/management of the content, and (b) weighted connection
(bandwidth/delay) costs to the chosen location. We study a Facility Location game played among
selfish agents (enterprises), that naturally models this situation. We use a fair cost allocation rule
- known as Shapley cost-sharing [3] - for facility installation costs: for a location v installation cost
1Member of The Center for Algorithmic Game Theory, funded by the Carlsberg Foundation, Denmark.
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βv is shared in a fair manner among agents that receive service from v, so that agent i pays
wiβv
W(v)
,
where W(v) denotes the total demand forwarded to v. The weighted connection cost is given by
wid(ui, v), where d(ui, v) denotes connection cost per unit of demand.
Our work focuses on bounding the social cost of cost-efficient and stable network infrastructures;
stable networks will be represented by pure strategy Nash equilibria and strong equilibria of the
corresponding Facility Location game. The social cost will be the sum of individual costs experi-
enced by the agents-players of the game. Strong equilibria are an extension of pure Nash equilibria,
dicussed in [2, 9], and essentially introduced by Aumann in [5]. Strong equilibria are resilient to
coalitional pure deviations: a strategy profile is a strong equilibrium if no subset of agents can
deviate (by jointly adopting a different pure strategy), so that all of its members are better off.
Thus this notion captures the possibility of coalitional behavior among agents. Occurence of such
behavior is naturally expected in rapidly evolving modern markets, especially the ones involving
the exploitation and exchange of digital goods and services.
We derive bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of pure equilibria, defined as the cost of
the least expensive equilibrium relative to the socially optimum cost [3]. For strong equilibria we
derive bounds on their (strong) Price of Anarchy (SPoA), i.e. the cost of the most expensive strong
equilibrium relative to the socially optimum cost. Let us note that the Price of Anarchy of pure
Nash equilibria was introduced in [12] as the cost of the most expensive pure Nash equilibrium
relative to the socially optimum cost, and measures essentially social cost losses incurred due to
selfishness of agents, and lack of coordination among them. The PoS on the other hand measures
social cost losses only due to selfishness: if all players coordinate (even by following some externally
provided instructions, or by interacting on the basis of a common protocol) they may reach the
least expensive equilibrium. The notion of strong equilibria inherently permits coordination among
subsets of agents. Therefore we can intuitively expect the SPoA to almost match the PoS. Our
results confirm this intuition.
The study of the price of stability in network design games with fair allocation of network
link costs was initiated in [3]. One challenging problem remaining open since then is improving
upon an upper bound of PoS = O(logn) and a lower bound (recently shown in [10]) of 12
7
, for
unweighted players on undirected networks. A series of recent works [10, 6, 7, 9, 1] provides results
(polylogarithmic upper bounds) with respect to the social cost of pure Nash and (approximate)
strong equilibria in the network design game model of [3], also for the case of weighted players. We
review these results in section 2. We also explain how the Facility Location game that we study
is a special case of the more general model introduced in [3], that also includes “delay” costs in
using network links (refered to as connection costs in the case of Facility Location), apart from
fairly allocated “installation” costs. For the case of metric connection costs we were able to prove
greatly improved and almost tight bounds for the PoS and the SPoA; this makes the metric Facility
Location game and exceptional special case of the model introduced in [3].
Summary of Results We analyze the PoS of the unweighted metric Facility Location game
(section 4), and prove constant upper and lower bounds. Note that an O(lnn) general upper
bound implied by the work of [3] is tight for non-metric networks (we discuss this in section 3).
Our technique relies on direct analysis of social cost evolution during an iterative best response
performed by the agents, until they reach equilibrium. We show in particular that given any
initial configuration (including the social optimum), the social cost of the reached equilibrium
is at most 2.36 times the initial social cost and at least 1.45 times this cost in the worst case.
Metric Facility Location is the first case of the model proposed in [3], in which an additional
structural network property (triangle inequality) yields a constant almost tight Price of Stability.
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Metric Non-metric
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted
PNE | SE
√
| e-apx
√
| e-apx e-apx | e-apx
PoS ∈ (1.45, 2.36) Θ(lnn) O(lnW)
SPoA O(1) Θ(lnn) O(lnW)
Table 1: Summary: Facility Location Games with Fair Allocation of Facility Costs.
It is also interesting that incorporation of link delays (connection costs) makes the previously
derived O(H(n)) upper bounds tight for the non-metric unweighted game. Subsequently we study
strong equilibria (section 5). Although they do not always exist, we prove that α-approximate
strong equilibria exist (no subset deviation causes factor α improvement to all of its members),
for α ≥ e = 2.718 . . . in general networks and weighted agents. For the Price of Anarchy of
approximate strong equilibria (SPoA) we show an O(lnW) general upper bound which becomes
Θ(lnn) for unweighted agents (section 6). For the metric unweighted case we prove a constant
upper bound (section 6.1).
Except for the SPoA analysis in paragraph 6.1 (theorem 4), the rest of the described results
have appeared in [11], in a shorter version 1. We note that the analysis of the SPoA of approximate
strong equilibria for the metric unweighted case in paragraph 6.1 essentially generalizes the analysis
of the corresponding result appearing in [11] (theorem 2); this result concerned the SPoA of exact
strong equilibria only when they exist.
2 Related Work
Anshelevich et al. first studied the Price of Stability for network design games with general [4] and
fair cost allocation [4]. In the latter case n agents wish to connect node subsets over a network,
by strategically selecting links to use. Every network link is associated to two cost components, an
installation cost and a delay cost. Link installation cost is shared fairly among agents using the
same link in [3], while every agent experiences a delay cost given by a polynomial function of the
number of agents using the link. The authors showed that for unweighted agents these network
design games belong to the class of potential games introduced by Monderer and Shapley in [13],
hence they have pure strategy Nash equilibria. In particular, a potential function defined in [13] is
associated to these games in the following manner: an arbitrarily initialized iterative best response
procedure carried out by the players reaches a local minimum of the potential function, which
corresponds to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. In [3] the authors developed elegant
arguments using the potential function, so as to upper bound the PoS for unweighted agents. In
case of polynomial delay costs of degree at most k the PoS was shown to be at most O((k+1) lnn).
For the case of directed networks this bound was shown to be tight (for k=0 and zero delays),
whereas for undirected networks a lower bound of 43 was given. This was recently improved to
12
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by Fiat et al. [10], who also showed an upper bound of O(log logn) for PoS, when exactly one
agent resides on each node of the network and all agents need to connect to a common sink node
(single-sink case). For weighted agents a potential function proving existence of pure equilibria was
developed for only 2 agents in [3]. Chen et al. [7] showed that pure strategy Nash equilibria do not
always exist for weighted network design games with fair allocation of link installation costs. They
1A result of 2.36-approximate strong equilibria that appeared in a previous version of this report was erroneous
and has been removed.
3
developed a trade-off for the social cost of approximate equilibria versus the approximation factor,
as a function of the maximum weight taken over all agents.
An extensive study of strong equilibria for network design games with fair cost allocation (but
without delays) appeared recently by Albers in [1], for unweighted and weighted agents. Strong
equilibria do not always exist, but she showed that O(H(n)) and O(lnW)-approximate strong
equilibria do exist (W is the sum of the agents’ weights) for unweighted and weighted games
respectively. She proved O(H(n)) and O(lnW) upper bounds for the SPoA of approximate strong
equilibria which are tight for directed graphs. For undirected graphs she showed Ω(
√
logn) and
Ω(
√
logW) lower bounds. Finally and most importantly, she showed an Ω( logW
log logW) lower bound
for the PoS of weighted network design games. Strong equilibria in the context of (single-sink)
unweighted network design games with fair cost sharing were first studied in [9]. The authors gave
topological characterizations for the existence of strong equilibria on directed networks, and proved
that SPoA = Θ(logn).
As of the recent literature, the gap for the identification of the PoS of network design games
with fair cost allocation remains open for unweighted agents, with the lower bound of 127 being
the best known so far, to the best of our knowledge. In effect, this means that the impact of an
undirected network structure to the PoS is not well understood, since the upper bounding potential
function arguments developed in [3] do not incorporate network structure. The Facility Location
game is a special case of the model studied in [3], that is interesting on its own right: it finds
numerous applications and exhibits intriguing characteristics. It emboddies non-shareable delays
explicitly and in a sense specializes single-sink network design considered in [9, 7]: we can simply
augment the network with a node t and set links (v, t) to have fairly shareable cost, equal to the
facility opening cost at v. The original network links have a delay cost only. Then every agent
needs to choose at most two edges from the node it resides on, to t.
Facility Location Games An unweighted metric facility location game with uniform facility
costs was studied in the context of selfish caching in [8]. The network model of that work is
essentially equivalent to the one we discuss here, apart from the fact that fair cost-sharing of
facility costs was not used: an agent could connect to a facility payed exclusively by another agent.
Another difference is that facility opening cost was uniform accross all nodes of the network, whereas
we consider node-dependent costs. The PoA and PoS of this model were shown to be unbounded.
The authors devised an extension of their game model, with payments exchanged among agents,
in which the socially optimum configuration of the original game is rendered a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (hence PoS = 1 for the extended game). Vetta studied a class of games for competitive
facility location [15], for which he proved existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and an upper
bound of 2 for the PoA. In this competitive setting enterprises open facilities at certain nodes
and try to attract customers to connect to them. He also illustrated applicability of his model
in the context of the k-median problem model. In [6] the authors considered single-sink network
design with fair cost-sharing of all resources (network links) used by agents. They argued how this
model can be viewed as a Facility Location model, but did not take connection costs (non-shareable
delays) into account.
3 Definitions and Preliminaries
The network will be a complete graph G(V, E), each edge (u, v) of which is associated to a non-
negative cost d(u, v). We consider a set A of n agents. Each agent i resides on a node ui ∈ V , and
is associated to a non-negative demand weight wi. The strategy space of agent i is V : i chooses
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a location v ∈ V , where it will receive service from. Opening a facility at node v ∈ V costs βv. A
strategy profile (configuration) is denoted by s = (s1, . . . , sn), where si ∈ V . The total weight of
agents receiving service from v under s is Ws(v). The cost ci(s) experienced by agent i in s is:
ci(s) = wid(ui, si) +
wiβsi
Ws(si)
Every agent i pays a fraction wi
Ws(si)
of the facility installation cost at si. Denote by Fs ⊆ V the set
of facility locations specified under s. The social cost c(s) is then:
c(s) =
∑
i
ci(s) =
∑
i
wid(ui, si) +
∑
i
wiβsi
Ws(si)
=
∑
i
wid(ui, si) +
∑
v∈Fs
βv
We use W(I) for the sum of weights of agents in set I. By cI(s) we denote the total cost of agents
in I under s. Furthermore, given a facility v ∈ Fs, we use cv(s) to denote
∑
i:si=v
ci(s).
Pure Nash Equilibria The unweighted Facility Location game specializes network design games
first studied in [3], and is a potential game [13]; it is associated to a potential function, that can be
locally minimized by iterative best response performed by players, and the reached local minimum
corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium. In iterative best response we choose iteratively an arbitrary
player i, and let him/her decide a strategy that minimizes its individual cost with respect to the
current configuration s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) for the rest of the players. The process ends
when no player i can improve his/her individual cost under s−i. Then s is a pure Nash equilibrium.
A simple example shows that the PoA of pure equilibria can be n in the worst case. Take a
network of two nodes u, v. Opening a facility on either node has a cost β. We set d(u, v) = (n−1)β
n
,
and let n agents reside on u. Then if every agent i plays si = v, i = 1 . . . n, the resulting
configuration is a pure Nash equilibrium of cost nβ, because every agent pays exactly β and has
no incentive to open a facility at node u by paying the same cost β. The social optimum consists
of a single facility opened on u and all agents being locally serviced by it, at zero connection cost.
Thus the socially optimum cost is β.
Potential function arguments developed in [3] yield an upper bound of H(n) for the PoS, where
H(n) is the n-th harmonic number. This bound is tight for unweighted non-metric Facility Location.
Fig. 1 presents a non-metric lower bounding example for unweighted agents. Assume uniform
facility costs equal to 1. 2n unweighted agents reside on boldly drawn nodes, n of them on v2.
The social optimum consists of facilities on v1 and v2, where v2 serves only the n agents residing
on v2. The rest are served by v1. However they deviate to v2 from v1 one by one. It is then:
PoS ≥ (2H(n) −H(2n))/(2+nǫ) ≥ (lnn− ln 2− 1)/(2+nǫ) = Ω(lnn). When it comes to metric
networks however, the PoS is constant as we show in the following section. This result essentially
indicates the impact of the network’s structure (triangle inequality) to the social cost of efficient
pure Nash equilibria.
Definition 1 (Strong Equilibria) [2, 5] A strategy profile s is a strong equilibrium if no subset
of agents can deviate in coordination, so that each and every one of its members is better off. It
is an α-approximate strong equilibrium if no subset of agents can deviate in coordination, so that
each and every one of its members is better off by a factor strictly more than α ≥ 1.
4 Unweighted Metric Facility Location: The Price of Stability
We analyze evolution of an equilibrium through iterative best response, initialized at configuration
s∗. In fact, for any strategy profile s that is reached through iterative best response initialized at s∗,
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v1
ǫ ǫ ǫ ǫ
dn−2dn d1dn−1
v2
n agents on v2
di =
1
i
−
1
n+i, i = 1 . . . n
Figure 1: Lower bounding example for unweighted (non-metric) PoS.
we will upper bound the ratio c(s)/c(s∗). Thus we do not require that s∗ be the socially optimum
configuration, nor that s is an equilibrium strategy profile. We only require that s is reached by
iterative best response initialized at s∗. Then taking s∗ to be the socially optimum configuration
and s to be the reached equilibrium will yield an upper bound for the Price of Stability, as a
corollary. To facilitate clarity, we give a brief description of the analysis’ plan. Given any facility
node v ∈ Fs∗ denote by As∗(v) = {i|s∗i = v} the subset of agents connected to v in s∗. Then cv(s∗)
will be the total cost incurred by As∗(v) collectively. We will upper bound c(s)/c(s
∗) as follows:
c(s)
c(s∗)
≤
∑
v∈Fs∗
∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s)∑
v∈Fs∗
∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s
∗)
=
∑
v∈Fs∗
∑
i∈As∗(v)ci(s)∑
v∈Fs∗ cv(s
∗)
≤ max
v∈Fs∗
∑
i∈As∗(v)ci(s)
cv(s∗)
(1)
Define ∆c(i) = ci(s) − ci(s
∗) to be the increase in cost caused by agent i during iterative best
response initialized at s∗ and reaching s. For any subset A ′ ⊆ A of agents we also use ∆c(A ′) =∑
i∈A′(ci(s)−ci(s
∗)). To evaluate the upper bounding expression (1), we are going to use an upper
bound on ∆c(As∗(v)) =
∑
i:s∗
i
=v∆c(i), valid for any v ∈ Fs∗ . This is the increase in social cost
caused during iterative best response by agents connected to v in s∗. Then for any v ∈ Fs∗ we
will maximize cv(s
∗)+∆c(As∗(v))
cv(s∗)
, by lower bounding cv(s
∗) for any v ∈ Fs∗ . In determining an upper
bound on ∆c(As∗(v)) we prove the following lemma, which charges any specific agent i a bounded
amount of social cost increase during the execution of iterative best response.
Lemma 1 Let As∗(v) be the subset of agents that are connected to v in s
∗. For any i ∈ As∗(v)
define Ais∗(v) ⊆ As∗(v) to be the subset of agents that have not yet deviated from v, exactly before
the first deviation of i. Then ∆c(i) ≤ βv/|Ais∗(v)|.
Proof. For simplicity let |Ais∗(v)| = ki(v). Clearly i ∈ Ais∗(v). Let us analyze contribution of i to
social cost increase during its first deviation. By deviating, i reduces its individual cost from ci to
c ′i, by joining another facility node v
′. Then:
ci = xi(v) +
βv
ki(v)
, c ′i = xi(v
′) +
βv′
λi(v ′)
xi(v) and xi(v
′) is the connection cost payed by i before and after its first deviation. λi(v ′) is the
number of agents sharing facility cost at v ′, including i. Since ci(v ′) < ci(v), it is xi(v ′) − xi(v) ≤
βv
ki(v)
−
βv ′
λi(v′)
. Let ∆cv(i) = c
′
i−ci be the difference caused to the social cost by this single deviation
of i. We examine the following cases:
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1. ki(v) > 1, λi(v
′) > 1: Then ∆cv(i) = xi(v ′) − xi(v) ≤ βvki(v) −
βv ′
λi(v′)
.
2. ki(v) = 1, λi(v
′) > 1: Then ∆cv(i) = −βv+ xi(v ′) − xi(v) ≤ − βv ′λi(v′).
3. ki(v) > 1, λi(v
′) = 1: Then ∆cv(i) = βv′ + xi(v ′) − xi(v) ≤ βvki(v).
4. ki(v) = 1, λi(v
′) = 1: Then ∆cv(i) = βv′ − βv+ xi(v ′) − xi(v) ≤ 0.
Clearly the above hold in general during execution of iterative best response, for any agent that
performs a single deviation from a node v to a node v ′.
Now we implement a charging procedure along with iterative best response. Give all agents an
initial label ℓ(i) = i, before executing iterative best response. The labels will be updated during
iterative best response, so that increases caused by agent i will be charged to an appropriate agent
ℓ(i). Initialize ∆c(ℓ(i)) = 0 for all i ∈ A. We will make use of the auxiliary variables ki(v) and λi(v ′),
as they were described before. At any time λi(v) is the number of agents (including i) connected to
v, right after i joined v. We need to initialize λi(v) to a value for every v ∈ Fs∗ and i ∈ As∗(v), to
implement the charging scheme. Set λℓ(i) = λi to a distinct value from {1, 2, . . . , |As∗(v)|}. kℓ(i)(v)
will be always (during iterative best response) the number of agents connected to v exactly before
deviation of i from v (before i leaves v). Charging is then implemented by relabeling deviating
agents in the following manner.
1. If kℓ(i)(v) = λℓ(i)(v) no relabeling is needed.
2. Otherwise there must be some j 6= i connected to v such that λℓ(j)(v) = kℓ(i)(v). In this case
exchange labels of i and j.
Subsequently add the increase caused by deviation of i to ∆c(ℓ(i)). Finally, set λℓ(i)(v
′) equal to
the number of agents connected to v ′ right after i has joined v ′.
By the previous definitions it follows that if kℓ(i)(v) 6= λℓ(i)(v), then it is always kℓ(i)(v) > λℓ(i)(v),
i.e. i has joined v before some agent j with λℓ(j)(v) = kℓ(i)(v), but leaves v “out of order”, i.e. before
j leaves. By exchanging labels of i,j we add the increase caused by i to the agent that previously
labeled j. Possible increases in 1.,2.,3.,4., imply that any agent is charged by the end of iterative
best response at most βv
|Ai
s∗
(v)|
for some i. If we “guess” the exact order of first deviation of all
agents, we can initialize λi(v) = ki(v). Then each i itself will be charged at most
βv
|Ai
s∗
(v)|
. ✷
In what follows we are going to upper bound the ratio
∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s)
cv(s∗)
for any v ∈ Fs∗ . If no agent
i ∈ As∗(v) ever deviates from playing v, then clearly it will be
∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s)
cv(s∗)
= 1. Our analysis
focuses on two remaining cases: either (i) there is a non-empty set of agents As(v) ⊂ As∗(v) that
never deviate from v during iterative best response or (ii) all agents i ∈ As∗(v) deviate from v during
iterative best response. Case (i) is examined in proposition 1, whereas the analysis is concluded by
analysis of (ii) in theorem 1.
Proposition 1 Let s be a strategy profile reached by iterative best response initialized at strat-
egy profile s∗. For any facility v ∈ Fs∗ define As∗(v) = {i|s∗i = v} and let As(v) ⊂ As∗(v) the
subset of agents that never deviated from v, during iterative best response. If As(v) 6= ∅, then∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s) ≤ 2.36 · cv(s∗).
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Proof. As discussed previously, we will upper bound the ratio cv(s
∗)+∆c(As∗(v))
cv(s∗)
, by deriving an
upper bound for ∆c(As∗(v)) and a lower bound for cv(s
∗). By lemma 1 follows immediately:
∆c(As∗(v)) ≤ βv[H(|As∗(v)) −H(|As(v)|)] (2)
because agents in As(v) never deviated, whereas the rest caused a cost increase equal to βv times
a harmonic series term each. In what follows we show a lower bound on cv(s
∗).
Fix any facility v ∈ Fs∗ , and define Is∗(v) = As∗(v) \As(v). Without loss of generality assume
such an order of agents, that agents i ∈ Is∗(v) (and for every v ∈ Fs∗) “best-respond” consecutively;
e.g. assume that the algorithm scans the facilities in Fs∗ in an arbitrary fixed order and for each
facility, the agents connected to it in an arbitrary fixed order. We focus only on the first deviation
of each agent i ∈ Is∗(v) for some v ∈ Fs∗ . Let v ′ be the node that i deviates to. For convenience we
use x∗i = d(ui, v) and let δx
∗
i = d(ui, v
′) −d(ui, v). Let λi be the total number of agents connected
to v ′ right after deviation of i. The new cost of i right after its first deviation is: x∗i + δx
∗
i +
βv ′
λi
.
For any other agent j ∈ As∗(v)\ {i} that, either deviates from v to some node v ′′ after the deviation
of i, or never deviated from v (in this case consider a trivial deviation with v ′′ = v), we have
respectively:
d(uj, v) + δx
∗
j +
βv′′
λj
≤ d(uj, v ′) + βv
′
λi
(3)
Substitute d(uj, v
′) in (3) by triangle inequality: d(uj, v ′) ≤ d(uj, v) + d(ui, v) + d(ui, v ′). Let
k∗i denote the number of agents connected to v right before deviation of i from v. Also note that
δx∗i +
βv ′
λi
≤ βvk∗
i
, because i decreases its individual cost by deviating. Thus we obtain:
d(ui, v) ≥ 1
2
(
δx∗j − δx
∗
i +
βv′′
λj
−
βv′
λi
)
≥ 1
2
(
δx∗j +
βv′′
λj
−
βv
k∗i
)
(4)
Because d(ui, v) ≥ 0, and because the latter has to hold for every pair of distinct agents i, j ∈ As∗(v),
we deduce:
d(ui, v) ≥ 1
2
[
max
j:s∗
j
=v
(
δx∗j +
βv′′
λj
)
−
βv
k∗i
]
(5)
We use (5) for the connection cost of agents in Is∗(v), and 0 for agents in As(v) = As∗(v) \
Is∗(v); in essence for every i ∈ As(v) we simply set in (5) v ′′ = v, k∗i = |As(v)|, and take
maxj:s∗
j
=v
(
δx∗j +
βv ′′
λj
)
= βv
|As(v)|
. The cost cv(s
∗) is then:
cv(s
∗) ≥ βv+ βv
2
|As∗(v)|∑
k=|As(v)|
( 1
|As(v)|
−
1
k
)
= βv+
βv
2
( |As∗(v)| − |As(v)|
|As(v)|
−H(|As∗(v)|) +H(|As(v)|)
)
(6)
Using the bounds (6) and (2) we deduce the following upper bound:

 ∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s)

 /cv(s∗) ≤ 1+
1
2
(
|As∗(v)|−|As(v)|
|As(v)|
+H(|As∗(v)|) −H(|As(v)|)
)
1+ 1
2
(
|As∗(v)|−|As(v)|
|As(v)|
−H(|As∗(v)|) +H(|As(v)|)
)
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≤ 1.5+ |As∗(v)|/|As(v)| + ln(|As∗(v)|/|As(v)|)
0.5+ |As∗(v)|/|As(v)| − ln(|As∗(v)|/|As(v)|)
(7)
The latter inequality follows by bounds for the harmonic number, i.e. γ+ lnm ≤ H(m) ≤ 1+ lnm,
where γ > 0.5 is the Euler constant. By setting y = |As∗(v)|/|As(v)|, we can numerically maximize
the upper bound with respect to y, to at most 2.36, for y ≃ 2.47. ✷
Theorem 1 If s is a strategy profile for the unweighted Metric Facility Location game, reached by
iterative best response initialized at a strategy profile s∗, then c(s∗) ≤ 2.36c(s).
Proof. We only need to complement the result of proposition 1 by considering the case where
As(v) = ∅. That is, Is∗(v) = As∗(v), and all agents connected to v in s∗ deviate during iterative
best response. If for each i ∈ Is∗(v) that deviates from v to v ′ (v ′ is not necessarily the same for
every i) it is δx∗i +
βv ′
λi
≤ βv
|As∗(v)|
, then:
∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s) =
∑
i∈As∗(v)
(
x∗j + δx
∗
i +
βv′
λi
)
≤ βv+
∑
i∈As∗(v)
x∗i = cv(s
∗)
Thus, assume there is at least one agent j with δx∗j +
βv ′
λj
> βv
|As∗(v)|
. In general, let r be the largest
integer, so that δx∗i +
βv ′
λi
≤ βv
r
for all i ∈ Is∗(v) = As∗(v). Using the same arguments that led
to (5), and taking maxi
(
x∗i +
βv ′
λi
)
= βvr , we deduce:
x∗i = d(ui, v) ≥
1
2
(
βv
r
−
βv
k∗i
)
, for k∗i ≥ r and x∗i = d(ui, v) ≥ 0, for k∗i ≤ r (8)
Using (8) we end up with a similar lower bound to (6) for 1 ≤ r ≤ |As∗(v)|:
cv(s
∗) ≥ βv+ βv
2
|As∗(v)|∑
k=r
(1
r
−
1
k
)
= βv+
βv
2
( |As∗(v)| − r
r
−H(|As∗(v)|) +H(r)
)
(9)
To finish the proof, we note that by (8), deviation of agents with k∗i ≤ r, yields a total cost increase
(payed as new connection cost) of at most r× βr = βv, which is exactly equal to the cost saved by
closing the facility at v (because all agents deviate). Thus we can simulate the situation with the
case analyzed in proposition 1, by setting As(v) = {i ∈ As∗(v)|k∗i ≤ r} and r = |As(v)|, so as to end
up with (7). This is technically equivalent to assuming that agents i with k∗i ≤ r never deviated.✷
Corrolary 1 The Price of Stability for the unweighted Metric Facility Location game with fairly
allocated facility costs is at most 2.36.
4.1 A Lower Bound on the Price of Stability
We analyze a worst-case example, that makes the PoS for unweighted metric Facility Location at
least 1.45 asymptotically. Experimental evidence shows a lower bound > 1.77, which we believe is
tight for PoS. This is because the analysis of theorem 1 embodies some losses due to bounding of
harmonic numbers by logarithms.
Our construction appears in Fig. 2(a). Take 2n agents, n of them residing on a singe node v of
the network. Facility opening costs are assumed 1 everywhere. The social optimum s∗ has 1+
√
n
facilities: v and v∗l, l = 1 . . . k, where k =
√
n. Let the n agents residing on v be serviced by v in
s∗, whereas the rest are equally partitioned to facilities v∗l , l = 1 . . . k; every facility v
∗
l services a
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x∗i + δx
∗
i
v
v
∗
x
∗
i
(a) Lower bounding example.
n PoS
102 1.52471
103 1.69106
104 1.74604
105 1.76367
106 1.76927
107 1.77104
108 1.7716
(b) Obtained estimates.
Figure 2: Experimental estimation of a PoS lower bound for the unweighted metric case.
batch of k =
√
n agents. In the least expensive equilibrium s, all agents from each facility v∗l of s
∗
will deviate and miss-connect to v. We will analyze for any single facility v∗l - henceforth denoted
by v∗ - the ratio
(∑
i∈As∗(v∗) ci(s)
)
/cv∗(s
∗). Analysis for the rest of the facilities will be similar,
and will yield asymptotically the same result. In particular, by choosing to analyze any batch of k
agents that deviate from v∗ to v, the PoS will be lower bounded as:
PoS = lim
n→∞
1+
∑k
l=1
∑
i∈As∗(v∗l ) ci(s)
1+
∑k
l=1 cv∗l (s
∗)
≥ lim
n→∞
∑
i∈As∗(v∗) ci(s)
(1/
√
n + cv∗(s∗))
(10)
For some constant p ∈ (0, 1) we will have r = ⌈(1 − p)k⌉ of the agents in As∗(v) increase their
connection cost significantly by deviating, hence the social cost. For every i ∈ As∗(v) let x∗i be the
distance of i from v∗, and δx∗i the increase in connection cost after deviation. We determine x
∗
i and
δx∗i by following best responses of agents in As∗(v
∗). Let λ ≥ n be the number of agents already
connected to v before agents of As∗(v
∗) deviate to v in order. In particular:
• For i = 1 . . . r set δx∗i = 1k−i+1 − 1λ+i − ǫ; a small decrease ǫ > 0 causes i to deviate to v.
• For each of the remaining k− r agents set δx∗i = 1k−r+1.
By similar arguments as for the derivation of (3),(4) and triangle inequality, we obtain x∗i =
d(ui, v
∗) = max{0, 12(max δx
∗
j − δx
∗
i)}, where maxj δx
∗
j =
1
k−r+1. This yields x
∗
i = 0 for i > r (the
remaining k− r agents). Note that the k− r remaining agents will deviate to v, because they prefer
to pay strictly less than 1k−r+1 +
1
λ+r, instead of a cost share
1
k−r each, for the facility at v
∗. By
deviation they “shut-down” the facility at v∗ and decrease the social cost by 1, but pay a total
connection cost k−rk−r+1 for v, which tends to 1 for large n. Let us now derive the cost cv∗(s
∗). For
convenience we use the notation ∆H(p, q) to denote H(p) −H(q). For the first r agents, summing
up as in (6) yields:
cv∗(s
∗) = 1+
1
2
[ r
k− r + 1
− ∆H(k, k− r)
]
−
1
2
r
λ + r
+
1
2
∆H(λ + r, λ) (11)
The cost of agents in As∗(v
∗) after deviation is:
∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s) = cv∗(s
∗) − 1+ k−rk−r+1 +
∑r
i=1δx
∗
i .
By substituting
∑r
i=1δx
∗
i = ∆H(k, k− r) − ∆H(λ+ r, λ), we obtain:
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∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s) =
k− r
k− r + 1
+
1
2
[ r
k− r + 1
+ ∆H(k, k− r)
]
−
1
2
(
r
λ+ r
+ ∆H(λ + r, λ)
)
(12)
We simplify (11) and (12) and substitute to (10) appropriately. For ∆H(k, k−r) we use the following
bounds:
γ − 1+ ln
1
p+ 1/k
≤ ∆H(k, k− r) ≤ 1− γ + ln 1
p− 1/k
where γ > 0.5 is the Euler constant. Also we use 1−p−1/k
p+2/k
≤ rk−r+1 ≤ 1−pp , because (1− p)k− 1 ≤
r = ⌈(1− p)k⌉ ≤ (1− p)k+ 1. Then (10) becomes:
PoS ≥ lim
n→∞
k−r
k−r+1
+ 1
2
[
r
k−r+1
+ ∆H(k, k − r)
]
− 1
2
r
λ+r
− 1
2
∆H(λ + r, λ)
1√
n
+ 1+ 1
2
[
r
k−r+1
− ∆H(k, k − r)
]
− 1
2
r
λ+r
+ 1
2
∆H(λ + r, λ)
⇒ (13)
PoS ≥ lim
n→∞
p
√
n−1/k
p
√
n+2/k
+ 1
2
[
1−p−1/k
p+2/k
+ γ − 1+ ln 1
p+1/k
]
− 1
2
r
λ+r
− 1
2
∆H(λ + r, λ)
1√
n
+ 1+ 12
[
1−p
p + 1− γ− ln
1
p−1/k
]
− 12
r
λ+r +
1
2∆H(λ+ r, λ)
Notice that for large n, r
λ+r
→ 0, because r = (√n), and λ ≥ n. Furthermore it is ∆H(λ+r, λ)→ 0,
because ∆H(λ + r, λ) ≤ r
λ
, with λ ≥ n and r = O(√n). Assuming that p is a constant, the limits
of numerator and denominator exist, and we can use them to calculate the limit of the fraction.
Given γ > 0.5 the PoS lower bound is simplified to:
PoS >
(
1/4+
1
2
( 1
p
− lnp
))
/
(
3/4+
1
2
(1
p
+ lnp
))
Numerical maximization over p ∈ (0, 1) yields PoS > 1.45, for p ≃ 0.18. We also searched
computationally for r maximizing (13), for increasing n. For r = 0.27
√
n we found the values
appearing in the table 2(b) , that indicate PoS > 1.77. One can verify that any configuration other
than s∗ and s is more expensive, by definition of distances of agents from v and v∗l.
5 Approximate Strong Equilibria
Strong equilibria do not generally exist in the Facility Location game, even for unweighted agents
on metric networks with uniform facility costs. We illustrate this by an example, over the network
shown in Fig. 3. Consider the metric case in Figure 3. There are three unweighted agents i = 1..3
situated on distinct nodes ui of the depicted 6-node cycle. For any equilibrium strategy profile s
there exist two agents i, j, with j = (i + 1) mod 3 with ci(s) ≥ 1, cj(s) ≥ 89. By agreeing to open
a facility on vertex vi, i and j would change their costs to ci(s
′) = 8
9
and cj(s
′) = 7
9
respectively,
each lowering their cost by at least 19. Hence, this example does not have strong equilibria.
Existence of pure equilibria for weighted agents is also an open issue. However, we were able to
reduce to a constant the logarithmic approximation factor α known for general network design [1, 7].
In fact, our result is even more general, as it concerns strong equilibria. We make use of the following
remark.
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Figure 3: Example of non-existence of strong equilibria.
Remark 1 If an instance of the Facility Location game does not have strong equilibria, then there
is at least one cycle of deviations of particular coalitions that results in a circular sequence of
configurations {sj}kj=1 with s
1 = sk.
Given such a sequence {sj}kj=1, we denote the coalition that deviates from s
j to form sj+1 by Ij.
Such a deviation causes a cost decrease of agents in Ij and possibly a cost increase of agents in
A \ Ij. Recall that A is the set of all agents. We define two quantities, the weighted improvement
impr(Ij) for agents in Ij and the weighted damage dam(Ij) caused by agents in Ij respectively:
impr(Ij) =
∏
i∈Ij
(
ci(s
j)
ci(sj+1)
)wi
dam(Ij) =
∏
i∈A\Ij
(
ci(s
j+1)
ci(sj)
)wi
We derive an approximation factor that eliminates cycles.
Lemma 2 Let {sj}kj=1 with s
1 = sk be a cycle of configurations in a Facility Location game instance,
caused by consecutive deviations of coalitions. The game instance has an α-approximate strong equi-
librium if for all such sequences α ≥ dammax({sj}kj=1), where dammax({sj}kj=1) = max
j=1...k−1
dam(Ij)
1/W(Ij).
Proof. If there is no α-approximate strong equilibrium we know that there is at least one cycle
{sj}kj=1 such that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}∀i ∈ Ij : ci(s
j)
ci(sj+1)
> α.
Because s1 = sk we have that
∏k−1
j=1
ci(s
j)
ci(sj+1)
= 1 for every agent i. Then:
1 =
n∏
i=1

k−1∏
j=1
ci(s
j)
ci(sj+1)


wi
=
k−1∏
j=1
impr(Ij)
dam(Ij)
>
k−1∏
j=1
αW(Ij)(
dam(Ij)1/W(Ij)
)W(Ij)
It follows that dammax({s
j}kj=1) > α. Hence the lemma follows by contradiction. ✷
We derive an approximation factor as an upper bound of dammax({s
j}kj=1) for any cycle.
Theorem 2 For every α ≥ e there exist α-approximate strong equilibria in the Facility Location
game with fairly allocated facility costs, even for weighted agents and general networks.
Proof. We prove that dammax({s
j}kj=1) < e for every cycle {s
j}kj=1 of configurations and the result
follows from Lemma 2. Let Ij(v) be the set of agents going to v in s
j, but not in sj+1, and Aj(v) be
the set of agents going to v in both sj and sj+1. Note that Ij =
⋃
v∈V Ij(v), therefore:
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dammax({s
j}kj=1) = max
j

∏
v∈V

 ∏
i∈Aj(v)
(
ci(s
j+1)
ci(sj)
)wi
W(Ij(v))
W(Ij(v))


1
W(Ij)
⇒
dammax({s
j}kj=1) ≤ max
j,v

 ∏
i∈Aj(v)
(
ci(s
j+1)
ci(sj)
)wi
1
W(Ij(v))
Hence, we need only consider what happens at the worst case node. For an agent i in Aj(v) we get
that:
ci(s
j+1)
ci(sj)
=
wi
(
d(ui, v) +
βv
W
sj+1
(v)
)
wi
(
d(ui, v) +
βv
W(Ij(v))+W(Aj(v))
) ≤ 1+ W(Ij(v))
W(Aj(v))
It follows that:
dammax({s
j}kj=1) ≤ max
j,v
(
1+
W(Ij(v))
W(Aj(v))
)W(Aj(v))
W(Ij(v))
< lim
r→∞
(
1+
1
r
)r
= e
✷
Approximate strong equilibria are also approximate pure Nash equilibria, thus:
Corrolary 2 The Facility Location game with fairly allocated facility costs and weighted agents
has α-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibria for every α ≥ e.
6 The Strong Price of Anarchy
We derive next an upper bound on the SPoA of α-approximate strong equilibria, for the general
Facility Location game.
Theorem 3 For any constant α ≥ e, the Price of Anarchy of α-approximate strong equilibria for
the Facility Location game with fairly allocated facility costs, is upper bounded tightly by O(H(n))
for unweighted and by O(lnW) for weighted agents, where W is the sum of weights.
Proof. Let s and s∗ be the most expensive strong equilibrium and the socially optimum configu-
ration respectively. For any facility node v ∈ Fs∗ let As∗(v) and Is∗(v) be respectively the subsets of
agents connected to v in s∗, and connected to v in s∗ but not in s. We will upper bound the SPoA
by maxv∈Fs∗
[(∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s)
)
/cv(s
∗)
]
. Because s is an α-approximate strong equilibrium, for
every subset of Is∗(v) there is at least one agent i, that is not willing to deviate to v in coordination
with the rest agents of the subset. Let Is∗(v) = {1, . . . , |Is∗(v)|} and I
i
s∗(v) = {1, . . . , i}, where i is
not willing to deviate in coordination with Iis∗(v) \ {i}. Then:
ci(s) ≤ α
(
wid(ui, v) +
wiβv
W(Iis∗(v)) +Ws(v)
)
≤ α
(
wid(ui, v) +
wiβv
W(Iis∗(v))
)⇒
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Figure 4: Unweighted Non-metric Lower Bound for the SPoA of α-approximate strong equilibria
(α ≥ e).
∑
i∈Is∗(v)
ci(s) =
∑
i∈Is∗(v)
ci(s) ≤ α
( ∑
i∈Is∗(v)
wid(ui, v) + βv
|Is∗(v)|∑
i=1
wi
W(Iis∗(v))
)⇒
∑
i∈Is∗(v)
ci(s) ≤ α

|Is∗(v)|∑
i=1
wi
W(Iis∗(v))



 ∑
i∈Is∗(v)
wid(ui, v) + βv

⇒
∑
i∈Is∗(v)
ci(s) ≤ α

|Is∗(v)|∑
i=1
wi
W(Iis∗(v))

 cIs∗(v)(s∗) (14)
The result will follow from (14), because Is∗(v) ⊆ As∗(v), and agents in As∗(v) \ Is∗(v) play v in
s and s∗. We analyze the SPoA ratio. For wi = 1 it is W(Iis∗(v)) = |Iis∗(v)| = i, which yields
SPoA = O(αH(n)). For weighted agents set W(I0s∗(v)) = 0 and use x ≥ 1 + ln x for x ∈ (0, 1)
on (14):
α
|Is∗(v)|∑
i=1
(
1−
W(Ii−1s∗ (v))
W(Iis∗(v))
)
≤ −α
|Is∗(v)|∑
i=1
ln
W(Ii−1s∗ (v))
W(Iis∗(v))
= α(1+ lnW)
✷
Unweighted Lower BoundWe refer to Fig. 4 for a tight (non-metric) lower bounding example in
case of unweighted agents. Facility opening costs are 1. It is clear that all agents being connected to
node veq is the most expensive α-approximate equilibrium, of social cost αH(n): no agent coalition
has incentive to deviate to vopt, which is practically the node that all agents reside on, and results
in a social cost of virtually 1, for ǫ→ 0 (e.g. ǫ = n−2).
6.1 Unweighted Agents on Metric Networks
We prove the following for the SPoA of the unweighted metric Facility Location game:
Theorem 4 The Price of Anarchy of e-approximate strong equilibria in the unweighted metric
Facility Location game with fairly allocated facility costs is upper bounded by a constant.
14
Rv
As(v)
Is∗(v)
As∗(v)
Figure 5: The situation examined in the proof of theorem 4.
The proof of theorem 4 consists of several partial results that we will synthesize. Let s denote
any α-approximate strong equilibrium and s∗ the socially optimum cofiguration. We will upper
bound the SPoA again by maxv∈Fs∗
(∑
i∈As∗(v) ci(s)
)
/cv(s
∗)
)
. For any facility node v ∈ Fs∗ , define
As(v) ⊆ As∗(v) to be the subset of those agents that are connected to v both in s∗ and s. Define
Is∗(v) = As∗(v) \ As(v) to be the subset of agents that are connected to v in s
∗ but not in s. See
fig. 5 for an illustration of the definitions. To simplify notation we use d(ui, v) = x
∗
i , for i ∈ As∗(v).
At first we consider the following simple case:
Lemma 3 Let Is∗(v) be a subset of misconnected agents under α-approximate strong equilibrium
profile s. Let R denote agents connected to v under s, with R ⊆ A\As∗(v). If under s−R no agent of
Is∗(v) has incentive to deviate to v in coordination with Is∗(v), then
∑
i∈As∗(v)ci(s) ≤ (1+α)cv(s∗).
Proof. If under s−R no agent i ∈ Is∗(v) has incentive to deviate in coordination with Is∗(v)\ {i} to
v, then for every i ∈ Is∗(v) it is ci(s) ≤ αci(s∗), because s is an α-approximate strong equilibrium.
Then:
∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s) =
∑
i∈As(v)
ci(s) +
∑
i∈Is∗(v)
ci(s)
≤ βv+
∑
i∈As(v)
x∗i + α

βv+ ∑
i∈Is∗(v)
x∗i


≤ (1+ α)

βv+ ∑
i∈As∗(v)
x∗i


The latter equals (1+ α)cv(s
∗). ✷
For the rest of the analysis we treat the complementary case of that described in the previous
lemma. Assume there exists at least one agent i ∈ Is∗(v) willing to deviate to v in coordination
with the coalition Is∗(v) under s−R. Define a minimal disagreeing subset I
0
s∗(v) ⊆ Is∗(v) to be a
minimal subset of misconnected agents containing an agent i that would actually deviate to v with
I0s∗(v), under s−R. Then also define Js∗(v) = Is∗(v) \ I
0
s∗(v). Fix i ∈ I0s∗(v) to be from now on the
agent (or one of them if there are many) that would deviate to v in coordination with I0s∗(v). We
call i the unstable agent of the minimal disagreeing subset I0s∗(v). By definition, the following holds
for an unstable agent i of the minimal disagreeing subset:
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ci(s) > α
(
x∗i +
βv
|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|
)
(15)
The rest of the analysis consists of bounds for agents in I0s∗ and Js∗(v) separately. In particular,
lemmas 4 and 5 describe upper bounds for these sets respectively.
Lemma 4 Let Is∗(v) be a subset of misconnected agents under an α-approximate strong equilibrium
profile s. Let I0s∗(v) be a minimal disagreeing subset of Is∗(v) and i ∈ I0s∗(v) an unstable agent. Then:
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
cl(s) ≤ 2α
(
βv+
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l
)
(16)
Proof. By minimality of I0s∗(v), every agent l ∈ I0s∗(v) is not willing to deviate to v under s−R
with a coalition of size |I0s∗(v)| − 1. Thus for every l ∈ I0s∗(v):
cl(s) ≤ α
(
x∗l +
βv
|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)| − 1
)
Summing over I0s∗(v) yields:
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
cl(s) ≤ α
( ∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l +
|I0s∗(v)|βv
|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)| − 1
)
which is upper bounded by at most as in (16). ✷
Lemma 5 Let Is∗(v) be a subset of misconnected agents under an α-approximate strong equilibrium
profile s. Let I0s∗(v) be a minimal disagreeing subset of Is∗(v) and Js∗(v) = Is∗(v) \ I
0
s∗(v). Then:
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
cj(s) ≤ α

 ∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j + βv
(
H(|As∗(v)|) −H(|I
0
s∗(v)| + |As(v)|)
) (17)
Proof. Without loss of generality name agents j ∈ Js∗(v) by distinct indices 1, . . . , |Js∗(v)| and
define a series of supersets of I0s∗(v), as follows: I
j
s∗(v) = I
j−1
s∗ (v)∪ {j}. Because s is an α-approximate
strong equilibrium, every set Ijs∗(v) contains an agent that is not willing to deviate to v in coordi-
nation with Ijs∗(v). This agent is found either in I
0
s∗(v) − {i} or in I
j
s∗(v) \ I
0
s∗(v). We can assume
without any loss of generality that for subset Ijs∗(v) this agent is j; otherwise we only need to
exchange j with some agent from I0s∗(v) \ {i}. One easily verifies that, by definition of a minimal
disagreeing subset, such an exchange will not affect any of our previous results up to now. Then
we have:
cj(s) ≤ α
(
x∗j +
βv
|I
j
s∗(v)| + |As(v)| + |R|
)
, j = 1, . . . , |Js∗(v)| ∈ Js∗(v) (18)
We omit |R| and sum the inequality over j ∈ Js∗(v). The result follows. ✷
The following lemma will provide a lower bound for
∑
j∈Js∗(v)x
∗
j appearing in (17). Note that
lemma 4 provides a concrete upper bound for the cost (under strategy profile s) of agents in
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Is∗(v), as a function of their connection cost in the socially optimum configuration s
∗ and the
corresponding facility cost βv. This is not the case with lemma 5 for agents in Js∗(v); the upper
bound (17) involves socially optimum connection cost plus βv multiplied by additional terms of
harmonic numbers. Thus we need to determine how low the socially optimum connection cost can
be, in order to derive an upper bounding ratio for the SPoA.
Lemma 6 Let Is∗(v) be a subset of misconnected agents under α-approximate strong equilibrium
profile s. Let I0s∗(v) be a minimal disagreeing subset of Is∗(v) and Js∗(v) = Is∗(v) \ I
0
s∗(v). Then:
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j ≥
βv
1+ α
( |As∗(v)| − ⌈αr⌉
r
− α
(
H(|As∗(v)|) −H(⌈αr⌉)
))
, r = |I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)| (19)
Proof. Let i be the fixed unstable agent of I0s∗(v). Note that, under strategy profile s, i does not
have an incentive to join facility node sj for any j ∈ Js∗(v). Thus if j pays for sj a share of βsjλj (that
is, sj serves λj agents in total in s):
ci(s) ≤ α
(
d(ui, sj) +
βsj
1+ λj
)
≤ α
(
d(ui, v) + d(uj, v) + d(uj, sj) +
βsj
λj
)
⇒
ci(s) ≤ α
(
x∗i + x
∗
j + cj(s)
)
≤ α
(
x∗i + x
∗
j + α
(
x∗j +
βv
|I
j
s∗(v)| + |As(v)|
))
(20)
The latter inequality derives by usage of (18) for cj(s), and by safely omitting |R|. Using (20) and
the lower bound for ci(s) given in (15), we can solve for x
∗
j . By the definition of I
j
s∗(v) in lemma 5,
it is |Ijs∗(v)| = |I
0
s∗(v)| + j, j = 1, . . . , |Js∗(v)|. Then we obtain:
x∗j ≥ max
{
0,
βv
1+ α
( 1
|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|
−
α
j+ |I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|
)}
, j = 1, . . . , |Js∗(v)|
Finally we sum up the latter bound over all j. Notice that x∗j becomes non-negative only when
j + |I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)| ≥ α(|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|). Since j + |I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)| is an integral value, it
turns out that x∗j becomes non-negative for those values of j for which it is j + |I
0
s∗(v)| + |As(v)| ≥
⌈α(|I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|)⌉. Then, by setting r = |I0s∗(v)| + |As(v)|, and by summing up over all j we
obtain the specified lower bound. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4 Now we put everything together. A lower bound on cv(s
∗) is:
cv(s
∗) ≥ βv+
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j +
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l +
∑
i∈As(v)
x∗i
Accordingly, we obtain the following upper bound on
∑
i∈As∗(v)ci(s) by (16):
∑
i∈As∗(v)
ci(s) ≤
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
cl(s) +
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
cj(s) +
∑
i∈As(v)
ci(s)
≤ 2α
( ∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l + βv
)
+
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
cj(s) +
∑
i∈As(v)
ci(s)
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Using the latter bounds for cv(s
∗) and
∑
i∈As∗(v)ci(s), we deduce:
SPoA ≤ 1+
(
2αβv+ 2α
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l +
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
cj(s)
)
/
(
βv+
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)
x∗l +
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j
)
≤ 1+ 2α×
βv+
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j + βv (H(|As∗(v)|) −H(r))
βv+
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j
= 1+ 2α+ 2α× βv (H(|As∗(v)|) −H(r))
βv+
∑
j∈Js∗(v)
x∗j
(21)
The latter inequality emerged firstly by substitution from (17), and secondly by removal of
∑
l∈I0
s∗
(v)x
∗
l
from numerator and denominator. We maximize (21) by taking the lower bound of the denominator,
given in (19) and obtain:
SPoA ≤ 1+ 2α+ 2α H(|As∗(v)|) −H(r)
1+ 1
1+α
(
|As∗(v)|−⌈αr⌉
r
− α
(
H(|As∗(v)|) −H(⌈αr⌉)
)) (22)
Because ⌈αr⌉ ≤ (α+ 1)r, and by using logarithmic bounds for the harmonic numbers:
SPoA ≤ 1+ 2α + 2α 1− γ + ln
|As∗(v)|
r
1
1+α
(
|As∗(v)|
r
− α ln |As∗(v)|
r
+ α(γ+ lnα− 1)
)
By substituting 0.5 for γ > 0.5 and α = e we can maximize numerically the resulting upper
bounding function of y = |As∗(v)|r to at most a constant. Note that, when strong equilibria exist, it
is α = 1. Substituting so in (22) yields an upper bounding expression similar to the one of PoS (7),
up to constant multiplicative and additive terms. ✷
7 Open Problems
Further investigation of the weighted game is mostly challenging: it is not known whether this
game possesses pure equilibria. Designing a counter-example seems quite demanding, as the game
specializes in some sense the single-sink weighted network design game studied in [7]. For this case
pure equilibria were shown not to exist generally. Extending our analysis of the PoS and SPoA to
the weighted metric case appears to be also non-trivial. Finally, derivation of good lower bounds
for the PoS and the SPoA of the (non-metric) weighted case is an interesting aspect of research:
lower bounding techniques developed in [1] do not readily apply for Facility Location.
Acknowledgements For usefull discussions We thank the participants of theOpen Problems Jam
Sessions of CAGT: Daniel Andersson, Gudmund Skovbjerg Frandsen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen,
Peter Bro Miltersen, Rocio Santillan Rodriguez, Troels Bjerre Soerensen, Nikolaos Triandopoulos.
18
References
[1] S. Albers. On the value of coordination in network design. In Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 294–303, 2008.
[2] N. Andelman, M. Feldman, and Y. Mansour. Strong Price of Anarchy. In Proceedings of
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 189–198, 2007.
[3] E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. M. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden.
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation. In Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 295–304, 2004.
[4] E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, E. Tardos, and T. Wexler. Near-optimal network design with
selfish agents. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages
511–520, 2003.
[5] R. Aumann. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games. Contributions to
the Theory of Games IV, Annals of Mathematics Study 40, A. W. Tucker, R. D. Luce (eds.),
pages 287–324, 1959.
[6] C. Chekuri, J. Chuzhoy, L. Lewin-Eytan, J. Naor, and A. Orda. Non-cooperative multicast
and facility location games. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(EC), pages 72–81, 2006.
[7] H. Chen and T. Roughgarden. Network Design with Weighted Players. In Proceedings of the
ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), pages 29–38, 2006.
[8] B. Chun, K. Chaudhuri, H. Wee, M. Barreno, C. H. Papadimitriou, and J. Kubiatowicz.
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM
Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 2004.
[9] A. Epstein, M. Feldman, and Y. Mansour. Strong Equilibrium in Cost Sharing Connection
Games. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 84–92,
2007.
[10] A. Fiat, H. Kaplan, M. Levy, S. Olonetsky, and R. Shabo. On the price of stability for designing
undirected networks with fair cost allocations. In Proceedings of the International Colloquium
on Automata Languages and Programming (ICALP), pages 608–618, 2006.
[11] T. D. Hansen and O. A. Telelis. On Pure and (approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility
Location Games. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Internet and Network
Economics (WINE), pages 490–497, 2008.
[12] E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case Equilibria. In Proceedings of the In-
ternational Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), pages 404–413,
1999.
[13] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:124–143,
1996.
[14] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani (eds.). Algorithmic Game Theory.
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
19
[15] A. Vetta. Nash Equilibria in Competitive Societies, with Applications to Facility Location,
Traffic Routing and Auctions. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), pages 416–, 2002.
20
